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## **Executive Summary**

Bitdefender researchers have discovered a new TrickBot module (rdpScanDII) built for RDP bruteforcing operations on select targets. The new module was discovered on January 30 and, based on the IP addresses it targets, victims seem to be US-and Hong Kong-based, predominantly in the telecom industry.

Our researchers have kept a close eye on TrickBot. On January 30, 2020, our monitoring systems reported the delivery of a new module, performing bruteforce operations on a list of targets defined and sent by the attackers.

## **Key Findings**

#### rdpScanDII:

- New module that bruteforces RDP for a specific list of victims
- Still in development, as the module features a broken attack mode
- Targets mostly in telecom, education, and financial services in the United States and Hong Kong

#### TrickBot:

- Lateral movement modules receive the most updates
- Dynamic C&C infrastructure, mostly based in Russia.
- Over 100 new C&C IPs added each month, with an average lifetime of about 16 days

# Teaching and Old Dog New Tricks

While TrickBot is a Trojan that has been around since 2016, it turns out that you can teach an old dog new tricks. While it started out as a credential-harvesting threat mostly focusing on e-banking, its plugin-based design has made it much more than just a threat focused on financial data theft. Security companies and researchers have previously analyzed a wide range of modules, proving that the Trojan is still under active development and undergoing constant "feature upgrades".

The flexibility allowed by this modular architecture has turned TrickBot into a very complex and sophisticated malware capable of a wide range of malicious activities, as long as there is a plugin for it.

From "add-ons" for stealing OpenSSH and OpenVPN sensitive data, to modules that perform SIM-swapping attacks to take control of a user's telephone number, and even disabling Windows built-in security mechanisms before downloading its main modules, TrickBot is a jack-of-all-trades. Another interesting aspect is that, while there are a handful of core modules, each new module is accompanied by a



configuration file, potentially making each functionality fully independent.

TrickBot has been mostly distributed through spam campaigns but it was also seen in cahoots with other threats. Distributed by the Emotet spam-sending botnet to deliver Ryuk ransomware, TrickBot operators have extended its capabilities into one of the most advanced malware delivery vehicles out there.

This combo relied on Emotet for its huge spam campaign and effective social engineering, on TrickBot for its aggressive network spreading capabilities, and on the Ryuk ransomware for the final payload and direct monetization. The spam campaigns have focused on targeting organizations by going after enterprise assets.

# New module: rdpScanDll

The new module was discovered on January 30, and its main functionality is to perform bruteforce operations on a list of targets.

The modus operandi is similar to that of other plugins. The TrickBot executable will download the plugin and its configuration file (from one of the available online C&Cs) containing a list of servers with whom the plugin will communicate to retrieve commands to be executed. TrickBot will load the plugin, executing the "start" and "control" exported functions, passing the configuration file as an argument for the last mention function.

This plugin shares the configuration file with another module, vncDll, but uses different URL endpoints to distinguish itself.

The communication with these new servers has a certain pattern. The structure of the URLs the plugin is using is as follows:

https://<C&C>/<tag>/<computerID>/<controlEndpoint>

#### Where:

- C&C is one of the command and control servers from the configuration file
- tag is the group tag used by the underlying TrickBot sample

- computerID is the computer ID used by the underlying TrickBot sample
- controlEndpoint is one of the following:
  - /rdp/mode used to determine what kind of attack the plugin should use
  - /rdp/freq used to determine how frequently to report different statuses back to the server
  - /rdp/domains a list of IP: Port pairs that will be attacked (the targets); note that when the port is missing, the plugin will use the canonical RDP port of 3389
  - /rdp/over a list of IP: Port pairs that will be attacked after the previous list (returned by /rdp/ domains) is exhausted
  - /rdp/dict a list of passwords to try in the bruteforce process
  - /rdp/names a list of usernames to try in the bruteforce process
  - /81 used to report different statuses back to the server (what IP: Port pairs are online or offline and what username - passwords have matched)

The plugin has three attack modes at its disposal: **check, trybrute** and **brute**.

#### **Check Mode**

The **check** mode should check for RDP connection on the list of targets (both /rdp/domains and /rdp/over). To do that, it first retrieves the frequency, then it retrieves and checks the list of targeted IPs from /rdp/domains, and finally it retrieves and checks the list of targeted IPs from /rdp/over. During testing, we found the plugin retrieves and checks the IP list from /rdp/over repeatedly. If the plugin is deployed on a larger number of victims, these collective repeated checks could flood the C&C server with requests.

#### **TryBute Mode**

The **trybrute** mode will perform a bruteforce operation on the list of targeted IPs returned by /rdp/domains, and later on the one returned by /rdp/over, using the usernames from /rdp/names and the passwords from /rdp/dict.

#### **Brute Mode**

The plugin looks like it's still in development, besides the inclusion in the executable of a set of functions that aren't called, the attack mode **brute** seems broken. The brute attack mode doesn't fetch the username list, causing the plugin to use null passwords and usernames to authenticate on the targets list.



If a host is found online, the plugin reports to the C&C through a POST multipart request to the /81 endpoint with the list of online IPs. The same happens if the plugin finds the credentials to a certain target. The plugin also reports to the /81 endpoint on a regular basis, with information about its state. At the same time, it will report to the main TrickBot executable statistics about the state of the execution and, when it finds working credentials, the username and password it found for a particular target.

During the analysis of pScanDII module, we were able to retrieve several updates for the lists of targeted IPs (both / rdp/domains and /rdp/over). At the time of writing, the lists contained 49 IP addresses (/rdp/domains) and 5,964 IP addresses (/rdp/over). Most of these targets are located in Unites States and Hong Kong. The geographical distribution of these lists is illustrated below.




Fig. 1 - Geographical distribution of /rdp/over IP addresses




Fig. 2 - Geographical distribution of /rdp/domains IP addresses

When performing a screen on these targets, we found that they fall on different verticals, as observed in the chart below:




Fig. 3 - Most affected verticals

## **Modules overview**

TrickBot has an embedded list of command and control servers and a list of "must-have" plugins. First, it contacts the servers to retrieve these plugins, as well as an updated list of command and control servers and an additional list of servers, used only for downloading purposes. After these initial actions, it awaits further instructions. One command is to start a certain plugin. If that plugin does not exist, it uses the list of download servers to retrieve it first, then it loads the plugin and executes the indicated exported function (from the command). As a persistence mechanism, some of the plugins are loaded automatically when TrickBot malware is started, without waiting for a command from the C&C servers.

During the last 6 months of close monitoring and gathering statistics about this threat, our systems were able to retrieve updates for several different active plugins, gathered around different functionalities, proving to have all the right tools to perform an end-to-end attack:

#### · Lateral Movement

- WormDll/mWormDll/tWormDll a worm component responsible for spreading into the local network via SMB by exploiting through EternalBlue
- TabDII uses EternalRomance to spread into the network via SMB
- ShareDII/mShareDII/tShareDLL remote service manager using stolen credentials to install remote services on other computers from the network

#### Reconnaissance

- · SystemInfo collects information about the affected system
- · NetworkDII performs network mapping



Psfin - meant to identify POS-related terminals inside the compromised domain

#### Collection

- ImportDII collects varying browser information such as cookies or browser configuration
- · Pwgrab steals credentials from various applications
- aDII steals active directory credentials

#### Setting Foothold

- NewBCtestnDll performs reverse proxy and executes commands
- VncDII used by the attacker as RAT, giving the option to remotely view and control the victim's computer

#### Exfiltration

Mailsearcher - searches for files with certain extensions (usually document files)

#### · Financial data theft

InjectDII – used to steal financial information through webinjects by monitoring various banking websites

#### Credential Access

RdpscanDLL – performs bruteforce attack on a certain list of targets (indicated by the attacker)

While monitoring the updates of malicious plugins, we observed that the most frequently updated ones were those performing lateral movement: 32.07% of them were wormDII, 31.44% were shareDII and 16.35% were tabDII. The rest of the plugins had fewer than 5% occurrences.




Fig. 4 - Timeline for plugin update

Some of these plugins can have configuration files, which serve varying purposes. If needed, they will be retrieved from the command and control servers. Some of those retrieved by our researchers are described below:

- dinj configuration file for injectDLL plugin, containing information about targeted financial institutions; the attack
  uses server-side injections
- sinj configuration file for injectDLL plugin, containing information about targeted financial institutions; the attack uses redirections (also known as web fake injections).
- dpost also used by the injectDLL module, containing a list of servers; the stolen financial information is sent to
  one of the servers from this list



- · mailconf used by mailsearcher for exfiltration
- srv used by rdpScanDLL as a list of C&C servers
- vncconf used by vncDLL and rdpScanDll for as a list of C&C servers

## **C&C** servers

Our monitoring systems focused on collecting new command and control servers, both from embedded lists inside the samples and by constantly checking for C&C updates. We were able to retrieve 3,460 IP addresses, divided into 2,926 command and control servers and 556 servers dedicated to downloading new plugins, and 22 IPs serving both roles. The dynamics of the infrastructure can be defined by a rough statistic of around 100 new IPs added each month with each IP having an average lifetime of about 16 days.

Illustrated below is the geographical distribution of these servers. As can be observed, the threat actor prefers infrastructure from Russia.



Fig. 5 - Geographical distribution of Command and Control servers



Fig. 6 - Geographical distribution of Servers used for download purposes



## Victims

Since TrickBot is a mass attack threat, spreading mostly through spam e-mails, victims fall into multiple verticals and are spread all over the globe. Telemetry from our Network Attack Defense technology for the last month shows that most victims attempting to connect to a command and control server are based in the US, followed by Spain. This kind of distribution usually can be observed when massive spam campaigns are focused on particular geographical areas.




Fig 7 - Geographical distribution of victims contacting command and control server over the last month

## **I** Conclusions

The new rdpScanDII module may be the latest in a long line of modules that have been used by the TrickBot Trojan, but it's one that stands out because of its use of a highly specific list of IP addresses. While the module seems to be under development, as one attack mode seems broken, newer versions of rdpScanDII will likely fix this and potentially add new ones.

The new module also offers a glimpse into how TrickBot operators act. Using an existing infrastructure of TrickBot victims, the new module suggests attackers may also be focusing on verticals other than financial, such as telecommunications services and education & research.

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## Indicators of Compromise

An up-to-date list of indicators of compromise is available to Bitdefender Advanced Threat Intelligence users. More information about the program is available at https://www.bitdefender.com/oem/advanced-threat-intelligence.html.

## Plugin samples

#### NewBCtestnD1132

6e61106594e106fc2192fdf341b63732d7cc2d13ee50dbb07234de416b851905
042774b7335f33a0813862b366c5fc2e70768f63b4cb0b98d53523a9636482b4
99f2d1f09246f6903a72d1056b96782a0242f1862d38d51e083e453acf1cde67
0cbca659207cc738798475355307ac580a75e5d3ac366ae377e622bb718ac723

#### NewBCtestnDll64

de7273f2d4a9f34523e4bb51cb867f91aafecc1dfbce8df93299bd4038b1af69 cc9afe85292904747cac2ab4f13d9e02414ec561315f186b844b135a9cfa45aa 3c665472455558ea2ce7a7de637d53dd1868baaa6eff77538d31303424a86fdd 8f2ff42df687d6e2ed6df2c3c45092be7a07347b9819c5cd7589c64c3b4dee60

#### importD1132

cd79145f9eff2131d015fb729b32d79270a1690d2955b0945d6b8451bafebb99 5a5ed23fafe8038a44213cefab6fbd392ff672e27025e4185f94c68fe6590e91 4eb803eb95eb8b9533e957706e1861932036beb5eef019bf77aaeba7202fa303

#### importD1164

03e19745382c0f0a94a098a6d58630ba2af2b6bf65e21a230084e8cadcbef368 709a62ed92806ee68cd062966102354cae371d0f9f7a9cd17edf31e4c8dcb663 e557d2018fae0621065c0d93836d09848d84f92e8188f947b8c8a1fa436f5632

#### injectD1132

a58f21fd1cf462ce8b3259aff19e03709a416b872ada566e8f11afcba2f20aeb 5bc9740e7f5b26d0d5522e2f6eb612908ea298c8f83476b3c455106342579a5c

#### injectD1164

fd8fb7d97a9f5f00c0a7306baafb54667ba0d34bd2bbd253554c3a036a8c7b24 26d1ecab7e74a7bd1ecc84ef047a4908cb22d2ef47da191c7163bc7749e035ff

#### mailsearcher32

a4f94ae7bd9ead9d4cb9f7510bd7af861767f1a1aa57e1c40c334e559b882cc7 79ff0c8a3338b7e97b3bd454373e163e8156ab8097229083eb1285940974f9d8

#### mailsearcher64

8e9623a5210e0e99e519f48abd5ff90601d8858d53613e0045c88b94113c560f c668899703e90877ea5498391b377ae58504768b050595266ea82434a82e68e5



#### mshareD1132
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#### mshareDll64
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#### mwormD1132

7af8aa870398f4687cd4cadef4bc5aead9c36c54878e027d5d227e61bac7d06d
4a0968256093530e606d8ced6fbdc77da7b10170aad9a8e91cfb67e6bf92e37b
d2bd6b842cbeb80f08403bf9fb694b47c7214d8634b3173ea8d87a4c1af8dedf
8429b23b05cc45f17da5f146039af9ff38b26f090e90337fc5125b9e9f98ebcb
de22e8b47a5e172303a5d8928eb4a03dbb728eb1026941d13bfe1467f97fe170
05504a56f9137c1b65490c18a50c9c6550473abfcc89ed08ce61eb0160ad6a11
c0560cbd24c4862341c646705424ed58cd800c1c78f82cdce01c09d622331bf8
dead3e2f4b66b60898868128363b68ebacea030954fa8b45ff70cc0abaaaf6df
4a3fe44f60d7f82370e13c25d77f500ff0a45f21645dc189c0c27cf71fc30828
b43881e63ef433624f3d29b09f48f4057ef22e2ca6624baa1fdc41e55083a496

#### mwormD1164

2b0c29f925d3d806623bd880fc1b3e6bc54d01014a8187fec010cb441d627c41
700d92359c78800590469c0ab4f5ea4b9deb76de812820ac059f7937e7e529c6
80f7f8d43e02da5e346bb930d29befd96028004f6549bc4dcabb10aa0d6d31e6
1f4ab725bb2137c82f2c84e7979322245fe2ac57725fc3d7e625e0f4bd5d8aa6
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0468dca9810c84d7f01dc48f089d555594ddeaa691b213c993bc8372eca85abc
272d921f8f75b3ed63fe15d5c15b134a4a8c3e5af7b94b8e634aedba8deb258e



7e648ee08c0e23439cdd5e6734a1efec680c06fe7e1bc07ed158a4ac1f249b0c 7209d656d9b8b15135ef6e4e56fff3af530c10b6b6859282c4285cad412cd36b 0557632c74a86fc612d9f428425b19615a525a279d8aad1df025ce7d389fe373

#### networkD1132

c8c789296cc8219d27b32c78e595d3ad6ee1467d2f451f627ce96782a9ff0c5f e8112e2293775325e623f347623553514b7ac3111856e594c21870a327a702ab ec26875adfa3922e048f1b1406f9b2ded1c4dd77fbad342ef78d9a9f0c09e2cb

#### networkD1164

99b51e28c9e57f3aff2e5753298e676fc6bbec8bef2b23c299a75ccfdcbd9ab3 85357172baec996f8b27c13ba5e71f76f6897005773580c914e2d0ef0c8529cd 7b85b56eef3ab1c1bd2cba1a0e215e37c4e087d6d0d40142edee8821c3377fdc

#### psfin32

accb0a583c2a361599460880f2ab31de768bd95cd3a06a4948a52addc555ca2c

#### psfin64

6c0b2d61b8b0f220b8ad59d98920af77d01b7eff84edcf582bcd3403817d9c1b

#### pwgrab32

f8a2bb30bea60dae8f7d15638350c79962669cc2a45912f0d52a4e0f209d0967 a46839052ed12db3687196dac249a651c7a58793552d191c83f35ce47d19abea 52f3d9a9e6a8e06e86acf5add134d3e77a80cf954584abd469e040879f80ec9a

#### pwgrab64

7c457d326b3fb97d3a48047d92e9a2a6968968cdbc4aa975539521a12f1952f9 9e5ed19e851e1decafa71a0cd24a16c4eb7cd2569f4d238726113ace04bcc5fe ca676483d55cbf63256fdf5828ada78d3fbb440aec391c03eef07744a31fbcfd

#### rdpscanD1132

 $\tt f0638d630e847f421656de482b0503e468f34ea13e913ee89b30acafcc05940e$ 

#### rdpscanDl164

b85284564923d39aaa0e64ccf1627e21a76188dbcefba1275bbe4bd3deeb9430

#### shareD1132

0c3042cf12dc545125f58a057570e0519fb03ee02464c61f7502ca16a759fd89
643f4afcf9a5b1045cb0f9bdef6850546817db09671b05865670a02a9a59126d
555f281cee6970b19879d8f7856954b84497740ad7f2ec74588ec452104b10d8
873bdf9ccff49dbb8a03a800195112743eed8001ec54f47941c818a0d2cadf29
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38a203e6573683cf8a495ebab078ab9c0db90b34977e5414e901c4f22e140480
7e1a2443c20f7d142b6b5ae170b726d28e459fdb9ca033a0944eed9905c3fe8a
17af9ac2da4bd5a180f39ece942dd454eaca1135cb4b4f6aaa9955564ed61c76
783e8393343ef26a8dfd865660e15cfcad702979c4e5fc44487645de11ebed28

#### shareD1164

786719da4638be77328ad3fd84763d6180da94801e5e968f0a98d85f9e4b43a6



14929993acedf51302fdd15d774e98e43b859d1f7af865a33d6fd8970149d900 c94d962c1eb72b27334a8fe09be727b8d5afd964bba76862f7ff8c67bc56534c acabcb79f0ba5acc60572953e7d642aea4549026efb807d588b8240513f53917 a557d251f790cf9030b34d462079668f2475d20b135fc9c444edd41258d00a8c 2fa917796b7bf2167e3152eb368b8c804f077ce202607c90c9c9bd611fa6dd71 359881db691dc8ef48cef5f2a8042655c71ee707989a512c178bf097417cf545 3827028486903803610cfd769a65bcc34400ad5e0914ef9c148c24c9ff89c11b 358b682614fdff5b5c3ecf00a89e55ba693b029748a21b2454e54518b921fe96 049549d9db41999958fa33d12b781d6b104eae40fe77c9dae2f09ea70553a556

#### systeminfo32

76db54ae9f221072fd63c2909ad2a3f2c7cf161ae198b58096545f4df00c024fbc071fd542a7fa17791fa2f876bce4e2981d2ba6a4116f533685864469e915dc19de921e3e862b5cf87dc5d378749e0752bad54bb6f432474668942bf7dce2e1

#### systeminfo64

55df055d4e9087e7692b439194300e90b286032928fbbb87508354ec6b71fc64 974dbc8132488c0022b4dd865b1607e8faa7dd6fccebd7112a3ae4492d1112ea

#### tabD1132

a559228b92b0377e281801f502ea65de1e2b3d42cfa24986578fb997d1d7989a
ce3a6d8cbc4d22abc8154bf913508716c8c5ee5f8bc80e6cd876a59c2b747c60
55f65f4c56f409ec4161d366d9c858430f781cb8975207256ac208d11699859f
724a2789ef56847fe5ece5e2339bd51e62bbc1181663e494502442dd86325b75
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461c169f4d99096360b39839b563599d91f1ed537cc829fd43b3617fb7b41c0a
0d7aef995678ed51ac9349e3a6b22db024a79b00c9228ddf8abb88e87938cd1c
157c4de12d4f746dc075545cd1cb6c9dabcbaf6f15502abecb5a86fb5a6d4d28

#### tabD1164

fe828ffc5a6c93d63633ba41284483d3885ec706c63792a18caba9b7a0218074
db93d4abc97a956ad77286dbb48efae64cd02d2f366ab758ed34de6940c570d2
bb41b7c0a350eac9bd7c44b7d6077ca94dd1f97c63d774207b22ffa1db544261
48c6297838049e8f5244ea7cae3dd0a678328cf8016e9c9526dcfdb94b8b49be
997b8be5c594123ed6f4f491c3b0062ec68c44c441aabd74cde53b267c1c7a5c
3963649ebfabe8f6277190be4300ecdb68d4b497ac5f81f38231d3e6c862a0a8
43eef20ca805e1501a149185d27c1fcd160a766b14e6c1bf47ba77acc6b9038b
70aa53c9ac1ff49aa6e0252746a2acefe90b8d912f57a6fa3f60d1bd194971ae
1bec303a51433cde51b3de640d9b04bcbb9167f15bef25898b88a35bc42243ae
cf543eb66a29c3b1d88e685cf7ed9f543e80367f4efa92d8a1f6789e96a249ce

#### tshareD1132

58f77b63494cce44ee6de4f72f9cec544f0aee0451e0b268cff10c97293b11ba



#### tshareD1164

afbec7bec0cd3b29f33b92ed541f26762ad9bb7837859af6ca13b3ed028c19f1

#### twormD1132

264e279e0da3d5820cdd03c39a23ee562e08932ef7e85e9cb8a3e70915db3ecc

#### twormD1164

9c768d72568917461e5fdf1118da126af8a3cb01192f80b47fb3b8fc27ff2581

#### wormD1132

09ce3637f90db2f328902c8ce6add108351556f5f936cf50621a902e484a9d2e
0c9bd21d85437ef7f3a024d512c70c631c3fbe74cc806d4b608c8aebf4e99526
7c9043991b864a72bbf41fa55f594ecd3ee76cded430ebb9cc3a1c83b0330957
588d77956fc66fec8ef8ca71c9166acb743671738bf29964bb29e1c714480e43
cd6950df48fc051f45652e85041b92aa9abd4ae8f78fde9d0cbc0a160b09f1ee
2fdc97ec644d31e650ce21dfc8764c3dabb97297ee43749ab0b8bdf83bbf56dd
ecdffde2f22e75d6455289133f0802f29c430bb481819d91717bf3a403cd1f34
42ed334fdd47c7632de55a0f1864c4b1ca909893c3b3f5ddc7dc66ba1e6af341
59f9312174c5daed6b10d3b09d7bc72c50c40438b96935b3276f057584a1232b
c326e3e4b2cb82e0d1747c881cecbfde36def0e205d0928972e54cd3a00fab43

#### wormDl164
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## TrickBot Samples
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10e271a213eff0f1f95cd1f97ebf62cff19a28195cf1f0eb0341a10bd195f561 2fae13dcd3782c5360de27d6c523092a1c497fa0a0103070ffd76a0197873277

## Command and Controls servers

45.148.120.13:443

5.2.78.77:443

107.172.165.149:443

45.148.120.14:443

23.95.231.164:447

51.89.73.154:447

45.148.120.31:447

178.156.202.143:447

198.23.252.136:447

64.44.133.39:447

146.185.253.170:447

185.252.144.64:447

## Why Bitdefender

#### **Proudly Serving Our Customers**

Bitdefender provides solutions and services for small business and medium enterprises, service providers and technology integrators. We take pride in the trust that enterprises such as Mentor, Honeywell, Yamaha, Speedway, Esurance or Safe Systems place in us.

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NSS Labs "Recommended" Rating in the NSS Labs AEP Group Test

SC Media Industry Innovator Award for Hypervisor Introspection, 2nd Year in

Gartner® Representative Vendor of Cloud-Workload Protection Platforms

#### **Dedicated To Our +20.000 Worldwide Partners**

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CRN 5-Star Partner, 4th Year in a Row. Recognized on CRN's Security 100 List. CRN Cloud Partner, 2nd year in a Row

More MSP-integrated solutions than any other security vendor

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Trusted Security Authority

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Through its leading forensics team, Bitdefender is also actively engaged in countering international cybercrime together with major law enforcement agencies such as FBI and Europol, in initiatives such as NoMoreRansom and TechAccord, as well as the takedown of black markets such as Hansa. Starting in 2019, Bitdefender is also a proudly appointed CVE Numbering Authority in MITRE Partnership.

RECOGNIZED BY LEADING ANALYSTS AND INDEPENDENT TESTING ORGANIZATIONS

**TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES** 

























## Bitdefender

Founded 2001, Romania Number of employees 1800+

Enterprise HQ – Santa Clara, CA, United States Technology HQ – Bucharest, Romania

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